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Precis
Subjects:
Political Sociology - Mexican Studies - Informal Economy - Social Movements.
Overview
The role of the state in allowing or failing to control informal economic activity has emerged as a key factor in understanding the structure and limits of such activity. Most studies, however, adopt a polity-centered approach, suggesting that informality may be allowed only if it benefits state goals such as promoting social stability (e.g. via "job" creation) or specific political party support through cooptation of informal economic actors. However, this argument ignores the political role of informal economic actors themselves.
Through the analysis of street vending--an activity that confronts the state by its occupation of public space--in a city where officials have often seen it from a negative point of view, this study uses a modified resource mobilization perspective to investigate the conditions under which vendors are able to thwart state attempts to limit or eliminate them. A historical comparison analyzes three periods: the late 50s, when street vending was severely repressed; the 70s and 80s, when city officials ineffectively attempted to limit street vending; and the early 90s, when City plans to remove vendors were unveiled. A second comparison analyzes conflicts between the city and vendors in four areas of the city comparing groups affiliated with the governing political party and groups affiliated with the opposition. It is argued that neither economic conditions nor general state political interests fully explain state behavior.
Instead this study makes two interrelated arguments to explain the persistence of street vending in Mexico City. First, that state power must be considered not only in terms of "state autonomy" but also in terms of "state integration"--the degree to which state agents perceive the interests of the "state" (or their agency) as their own interests. Secondly, that "resistance" on the part of street vendors is made effective by adapting to and manipulating the cooptative nature of the state itself.
250 pages + bibliography and index; Nine Figures; Two tables.
CHAPTER OUTLINE
- Acknowledgments.
- Preface.
- Chapter 1. Oreganizing the Poor: Informal Economic Actors and the State
- Chapter 2. State Integration and "Informal" Social Movements
- Chapter 3. The Mexican State: Cliques and Competition
- Chapter 4. The Commercial Role of Street Vending: Problems and Practices
- Chapter 5. Street vendors and the State: Co-optation Competition and Resistance
- Chapter 6. The Legacy of Uruchurtu: Repression and Renewal
- Chapter 7. The Historical Center: Repression and Resistance
- Chapter 8. Conclusion: The Political Economy of Street Vending
LIST OF FIGURES
- Figure 1. Employment in retailing by store size 1975-1988.
- Figure 2. Estimated number of vendor stalls by category.
- Figure 3. New market and concentration vendors by sexenio (1954-1988).
- Figure 4. Market stall construction phase of Presidential Term.
- Figure 5. Months overdue in mortgage payments.
- Figure 6. Average monthly sales before and after plaza project by sex and type of vendor.
- Figure 7. Problems identified by vendors (three choices) in new plazas.
- Figure 8. Problems mentioned by main area of concern.
- Figure 9. Loyalty to the PRI before and after plaza project: four criteria.
LIST OF TABLES
- Table I. Benefits and Costs of Formal and Informal Sectors.
- Table II. State Integration, visibility & organization of informal economic actors
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Preface
The concept of "informal economic activity" (IEA) implies the systematic evasion of state regulations, and it is generally recognized that this evasion is tolerated to some degree at the local level by state officials. Yet the political process of negotiation between IEA participants and state officials about the degree of toleration has been ignored because of the dominant assumption that the IEA is politically marginal. This book tests this assumption, using street vendors in Mexico City to argue that under certain conditions such "marginal" political actors can and do successfully challenge the state. This chapter also explains why Mexico City and street vending were chosen for this case study, and explains the methodology used in the analyses of chapters five, six and seven.
Chapter 1: Organizing the Poor: Informal Economic Actors and the State
Mexico City is "plagued", according to city officials, with 200,000 street vendors who appear immune to constant city attempts to control or limit their growth. But this has not always been so: during the 1960's the number of street vendors was insignificant because of a huge market construction program and severe repression. The question is posed as follows: Why did the City's ability to control street vending collapse after the 1960's? In this chapter, a "Political Economy of Informality" is proposed to explain the unique interest structure of informal economic actors and how they relate to the state.
Linked article: "The Informal Economy". (Encyclopedia of Political Economy. Phil O'Hara (Ed). Routledge, London & New York. 1989.)
Chapter 2. State Integration and "Informal" Social Movements
This chapter first develops a theory of "state integration" to provide an explanation for situations in which state officials fail to properly implement policies formulated by higher authorities. Theoretically, "state integration" measures the degree to which the interests of state agents, and agencies are integrated with state authorities. Low state integration, therefore, implies that the interests of state agencies and/or state agents may be best met by ignoring or even contradicting the interests of the state itself, either viewed abstractly or in terms of authority figures. This model is then applied to the issue of informality--a situation in which economic actors evade state regulations. Secondly, this chapter uses resource mobilization theory to explain how, under specific circumstances, informal economic actors can organize themselves in order to collude with state agents under conditions of low-state integration. First, it is argued that the degree of "state integration" of the Mexican state is exceptionally low because the policy of "no reelection" of officials and the division of the Mexican elite into multiple competing cliques ("camarillas") leads low level and medium officials to seek alliances with "popular" organizations in order to secure their own position within their cliques and thus provide for their political survival. Secondly, state attempts to coopt street vendors by forcing them to organize into civil associations affiliated with the PRI has provided the leaders of these associations with the financial and political resources to resist state policies by creating alliances with low and medium level state administrative and elected officials. Thus, the interests of street vendors and officials interlink. The first need to constantly defend their interests against City attempts to relocate, limit or remove them. The latter need support groups in "civil society" who will be constantly dependent on them.
Chapter 3. The Mexican State: Cliques and Competition
First, it is argued that the degree of "state integration" of the Mexican state is exceptionally low because the policy of "no reelection" of officials and the division of the Mexican elite into multiple competing cliques ("camarillas") leads low level and medium officials to seek alliances with "popular" organizations in order to secure their own position within their cliques and thus provide for their political survival. Secondly, state attempts to coopt street vendors by forcing them to organize into civil associations affiliated with the PRI has provided the leaders of these associations with the financial and political resources to resist state policies by creating alliances with low and medium level state administrative and elected officials. Thus, the interests of street vendors and officials interlink. The first need to constantly defend their interests against City attempts to relocate, limit or remove them. The latter need support groups in "civil society" who will be constantly dependent on them. Thus, unless very strong pressure comes from above to tackle groups that support their clique, officials are more likely to favor the interests of their clique's client groups over the orders of their nominal superiors within the state.
Chapter 4. The Commercial Role of Street Vending: Problems and Practices
Using data from participant observation and some previous surveys, the role and nature of street vending is discussed, exposing some of the "myths" surrounding this activity and detailing some of the benefits and problems associated with this activity. In particular, it is argued that street vending can be a highly efficient and effective form of commercial distribution and can be an effective mechanism for advancement for the poor.
Linked article: "Retailing in a neighborhood street market: A Tianguista family in Mexico City" (pubished in Cases in Retailing, Third Edition. Robert F. Lusch & Patrick Dunne (eds). 1988.)
Chapter 5. Street vendors and the State: Cooptation, Competition and Resistance
A comparison between four groups of street vendors locked in conflict with City officials and with other groups is used to demonstrate the political nature of street vending and the failure of city officials to prevent the growth of street vending in the current atmosphere nor even to guarantee that street vendors will remain within the PRI. By using two cases of competition between PRI affiliated vendors and two cases of competition between PRI and opposition affiliated groups, it is shown first how city policies compel street vendors to organize and promote authoritarianism within street vendor organizations that allows leaders to mobilize the resources of their members efficiently to safe-guard their areas. Secondly, it is shown that vendors affiliated with opposition parties, while still discriminated against by city officials, are also becoming more and more successful at thwarting attempts to control them by adopting the same strategies as PRI affiliated vendors.
Linked articles: "Cooptation, Competition and Resistance: State and Street Vendors in Mexico City," (Latin American Perspectives.)
Chapter 6. The Legacy of Uruchurtu: Repression and Renewal
Why was the City able to eliminate street vending in the 1960's, but subsequently lost that ability? Was it no longer in the City's interest to do so? From 1957-1966, the Mexico City government built over 100 markets at public expense for over 50,000 vendors. At the same time, they adopted a politically problematic policy of repression against street vendors who refused to occupy the markets, or who left them because of numerous unanticipated problems. Street vending grew, but opposed to the state that repressed it. This chapter shows that this policy was successful primarily because it was used for the political benefit of a single individual who monopolized political power in Mexico City from 1952 to 1966. When he was finally thrown out of office in 1966, his policies collapsed and became, paradoxically, the basis for the institutionalization of the powerful street vendor associations of today.
Linked article: "Taking Street Vendors off the Street: Historical Parallels in Mexico City". (Published in Spanish as: "El desalojo de los vendedores ambulantes: paralelismos historicos en la ciudad de Mexico" in Revista Mexicana de Sociología Vol 58, #2. 1996.)
Chapter 7. The Historical Center: Repression and Resistance
A recent program of market construction in the city center, pushed by a group of small merchants as well as by high level officials going up to the President, is examined to compare it with the early period of repression. It is argued that the city continues to foment the organizations of street vendors, but that their success to a certain degree reflects the high level of pressure on officials both from third parties and from above, paralleling the conditions of the 1960s. In addition, this success has been severely limited in scope by the street vendor associations, and in time by the constant pressure on the part of vendors to re-invade areas that were cleared. This chapter shows that these new policies were largely motivated by and carried out within the framework of the neo-liberal policies of the Salinas government, and details the devastating effect for many individual vendors.
Linked articles: "Breaking down Clientalism: The Formalization of Street Vending in Mexico City". (Revista Mexicana de Sociologia.) "Formalizing the Informal economy: The Case of Street Vendors in Mexico City". (Presented at the American Sociological Association. Washington, D.C. 8/21/95.)
Chapter 8. Conclusion: The Political Economy of Street Vending
The power that street vendors wield is a local one. It is the power to avoid state control, not the power to control the state. Nevertheless, it is still an important form of power to understand, within both this context and on a generalizable level. This power flourishes under conditions of "weak state integration" and the existence of multiple competing associations that have the ability to compel their members to participate in collective goals in exchange for individual benefits. These conditions are perfectly met by street vendors in Mexico City, but also exist among similar groups elsewhere in the third world. In the case of Mexico, it is also argued that street vendors are uniquely positioned to take advantage of this form of power because of their central location, flexible work hours, and constant need to defend their territory and thus remain organized. This explains why workers and peasants have historically been far more successfully controlled by the cooptative mechanism of the state. This chapter thus provides the basis for generalizing the practical theoretical framework developed through this case study.
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