In this exciting street-level analysis of the political system in Mexico City, a political sociologist provides a systematic account of a phenomena that is becoming ever more important to modern society: the informal economy--a realm of economic activity that lies outside the normal regulatory system of the modern state. By focusing on street vending in Mexico City, one of the most visible forms of informality in one of the largest cities in the world, the author is able to add provocative new insights into our understanding of the economic and political interest structures of informal economic activity, of the ability of the poor to empower themselves, and of the Mexican state and society.
Using an approach that combines macro and micro sociological tools of analysis, the author provides a holistic account of these insights by combining original research at the levels of the state, the city, the neighborhood street market, and the household. More than simple triangulation, the methodological approach allows the author to trace the effect of changes on the national and international level to the local and household level and back again. At the same time, the theoretical argument is strengthened by using both historical and case-level comparisons, involving research techniques that include archival research, surveys, participant-observation, and in-depth interviews carried out over a period of five years.
The result is a path-breaking study of the "political economy of economic informality" that contributes a systematic theory of its subject matter while raising new questions and theories about the state and social movements. Street vendors have been successful in defending their interests in Mexico City, the author argues, precisely because they are able to take advantage of features of the cooptative strategies of the Mexican State.
At the same time, it is argued that "state integration"--the integration of interest structures within the state--is a vital variable overlooked by many scholars analysing the state in the developing world. By showing that low state integration can lead to a separation between the interests of policy-makers and policy-implementers, the author demonstrates how street vendors, when strongly organized, can collude with policy-implementers within the state even when state policy-makers are controlled by higher level interest groups--typically national or international capital.
Included in the analysis are specific insights into the local political effect of political and economic liberalism in Mexico--steps taken towards democratization and economic neo-liberalism including the adoption of NAFTA.