UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
THORTON ELLIOTT, EUGENE McQUEEN, )
VERNON JOHNSON, MICHAEL CHOICE, )
FAMIOUS FRENCH, MARCUS LYONS, )
DARRYL LANE, RONNIE NELLON, )
CHARLES J. BEYER, JACKIE SMITH, )
SAUL LOCKETT, ZEKE RAND, LEO )
JOHNSON, LAWRENCE RAND, ROBERT )
JOHNSON, LOUIS DAVIS, ANTOINETTE )
JOHNSON, AND HUBERT WEBB, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
V. ) NO.
)
THE UNITED CENTER, A JOINT )
VENTURE f/k/a METRO-CHICAGO )
SPORTS STADIUM JOINT VENTURE ) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
) REQUESTED
Defendant. ) JURY DEMANDED
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND PRELIMINARY
AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Now come Plaintiffs, THORTON ELLIOTT, EUGENE McQUEEN, VERNON
JOHNSON, MICHAEL CHOICE, FAMIOUS FRENCH, MARCUS LYONS, DARRYL LANE,
RONNIE NELLON, CHARLES J. BEYER, JACKIE SMITH, SAUL LOCKETT, ZEKE
RAND, LEO JOHNSON, LAWRENCE RAND, ROBERT JOHNSON, LOUIS DAVIS,
ANTOINETTE JOHNSON, AND HUBERT WEBB, by their attorneys, Donald G.
Weiland and Mark Weinberg, and complaining of the Defendant, the
United Center, a joint venture, f/k/a Metro-Chicago Sports Stadium
Joint Venture, state as follows:
Nature of the Case
1. This action is brought by various vendors who have sold and
continue to sell peanuts outside the United Center. Plaintiffs
seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and damages under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. sec. 2), against the United
Center, a joint venture, f/k/a Metro-Chicago Sports Stadium Joint
Venture.
2. Plaintiffs allege that the policy that prohibits United
Center patrons from bringing peanuts into the United Center is an
unlawful practice that eliminates competition in concession sales
at the United Center and constitutes a willful attempt to maintain
a monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.
sec. 2).
Jurisdiction and Venue
3. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. sec. 15 and 26) and 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331
and 1337.
4. Venue is proper in this district because defendant's
offices are located in the Northern District of Illinois and the
unlawful acts complained of occurred in this district. Venue is
proper in this district pursuant to Section 12 of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. sec. 22) and 28 U.S.C. sec. 1391(b) and (c).
PlaintiffS
5. Plaintiffs, THORTON ELLIOTT, EUGENE McQUEEN, VERNON
JOHNSON, MICHAEL CHOICE, FAMIOUS FRENCH, MARCUS LYONS, DARRYL LANE,
RONNIE NELLON, CHARLES J. BEYER, JACKIE SMITH, SAUL LOCKETT, ZEKE
RAND, LEO JOHNSON, LAWRENCE RAND, ROBERT JOHNSON, LOUIS DAVIS,
ANTOINETTE JOHNSON, AND HUBERT WEBB, are residents of Cook County,
Illinois. Plaintiffs, at times relevant to this Complaint, sold
and continue to sell peanuts outside the United Center, in
compliance with existing ordinances.
6. Plaintiffs purchase their peanuts from various peanut
wholesalers in the Chicago area. The wholesalers import peanuts
from other states, including Georgia, for sale to the Plaintiffs
and to others.
7. Each year, Plaintiffs sell hundreds of thousands of
dollars worth of peanuts brought to Illinois through interstate
commerce.
8. Since the ban on patrons bringing peanuts into the United
Center, sales from wholesalers to the peanut vendors, and from the
peanut vendors to consumers, have dropped significantly.
Defendant
9. The United Center is a joint venture doing business in
Chicago, Illinois, with its principle place of business at 1901
West Madison Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
10. The United Center joint venture owns and operates the
United Center, a general purpose stadium located at 1901 W. Madison
Street, Chicago, Illinois, and is the home of the Chicago
Blackhawks and Chicago Bulls. The United Center also holds special
exhibits such as a circus, music concerts, college basketball
games, and others.
Business Activities of the Parties
11. Plaintiffs are among independent peanut vendors who sell
food on public sidewalks outside virtually every sports stadium in
the United States. A market for food concessions exists wherever
professional sporting events are held.
12. Like all other professional sports stadiums, the United
Center offers food concessions to its patrons.
13. The United Center offers a wide selection of food items
inside the stadium, including hotdogs, pizza, candy, popcorn,
pretzels, and cold drinks.
14. Though the United Center has a natural (also known as
innate) monopoly on concession sales inside the United Center,
competition for the sale of food concessions at the United Center
exists outside the stadium on the public sidewalks surrounding the
United Center.
15. Plaintiffs sell peanuts on the public sidewalks around
the United Center.
16. Plaintiffs and Defendant sell their goods to the same
patrons at the same time.
17. Defendant and Plaintiffs sell slightly different goods,
but the goods are substitute goods and fall under the general
category of snack foods.
18. Historically, the market for concessions of food at the
United Center has been dominated by concessions sold inside the
stadium.
19. At the old Chicago Stadium (formerly across the street
from the United Center), inside food concessions held a market
share of well over 90%.
20. For many years, significant amounts of food concessions
have been sold by independent vendors on the sidewalks outside the
Stadium, with estimated sales last year of over $500,000.
21. The sale of snack food concessions at the United Center
constitutes a relevant market under federal antitrust laws.
22. For food vendors outside of stadiums to compete in the
market for food concessions at stadiums, the food sold by outside
vendors must be allowed inside the stadiums.
23. If food sold by Plaintiffs is not allowed inside, stadium
patrons will not buy the food from outside vendors, knowing it will
prevent their admittance into the stadium.
24. Since peanuts are the only food sold directly outside of
the United Center to United Center patrons, Plaintiffs are the only
competitors in the relevant market for food concessions at the
United Center.
25. For legitimate business purposes, certain types of foods
are universally prohibited from being brought into most stadiums.
For example, alcohol, beer, bottles, and cans of any sort are not
allowed in almost all stadiums. There exists valid business
reasons for such prohibitions, e.g., the risk of not being able to
control the alcohol intake of fans, and the danger of irresponsible
fans throwing a cans or bottles onto the field of play.
26. The interstate commerce involved here is Plaintiffs'
purchase of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of peanuts which
are bought to this market from other states. In addition, sales of
these same peanuts are made to consumers from several states,
including Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Iowa.
Conduct of Defendants: Prohibition on Food
27. In September 1994, the United Center instituted a policy
that prohibits all food from being brought into the stadium.
28. Patrons of the United Center are inspected for food prior
to entering the stadium and, if food is found, it is confiscated by
stadium security.
29. The prohibition on bringing food inside the United Center
substantially injures competition in the market for food
concessions at the United Center: because they now know that
peanuts purchased outside the United Center will be confiscated
before entrance into the stadium, significant numbers of United
Center patrons no longer buy food from outside vendors.
30. The prohibition threatens over time to eliminate all
competition in the market for food concessions.
31. Plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct result of
Defendant's action. The average sales of peanuts have dropped to
approximately one-fifth of sales in previous years.
32. Many of the individual PlaintiffS have gone completely
out of business, and others struggle to survive by selling peanuts
to (a) patrons who are willing to "smuggle" in the peanuts in
violation of United Center policy, or (b) patrons unaware of the
stadium prohibition.
33. Such damage to competition is precisely the type sought
to be prevented by the antitrust laws.
34. Consumer welfare has been seriously harmed by the
prohibition. Consumer choice has been reduced by forcing patrons
inclined to eat a snack at the stadium to buy only what the United
Center sells.
35. The prohibition also eliminates any price competition in
the relevant market.
36. Market history shows that many consumers preferred to buy
peanuts outside of the old Chicago Stadium.
37. Consumers had come to rely on and enjoy the benefits of
competition in the market for concessions of food outside of the
old stadium.
38. Consumers would benefit from the same competition at the
new United Center.
Conduct of Defendants: Exclusionary Practice
39. Defendants possess monopoly control over the United
Center and monopoly control over the presentation of live NBA
basketball and live NHL hockey in the Chicago market.
40. The monopoly at issue includes certain unique events
available only at the United Center and profit from sales outside
the stadium at such events.
41. Defendant has a financial interest in food concessions
sold inside of the United Center and profits from such sales.
42. For Plaintiffs to compete with Defendant in the sale of
food concessions at the United Center, it is essential that peanuts
be allowed inside the United Center.
43. In this respect, the United Center is an essential
facility for Plaintiffs to compete with Defendant in the sale of
food concessions at the United Center.
44. Defendant has repeatedly refused to allow peanuts into
the United Center.
45. Stadium officials confiscate the peanuts of anyone trying
to bring peanuts into the stadium.
46. On information and belief, the policy prohibiting food in
the United Center is outlined in the United Center's operations
manual.
47. Defendant's denial of access to the United Center of
Plaintiffs' peanuts amounts to a refusal-to-deal with Plaintiffs.
48. Defendant could easily allow peanuts inside the stadium.
Peanuts have been allowed inside the old Chicago Stadium since it
was first built in 1927.
49. Peanuts are allowed in every other sports Stadium in
Chicago (i.e., Wrigley Field, Soldiers Field, and Comiskey Park).
50. Peanuts are allowed in virtually every sports stadium in
the United States. Peanuts at sporting events are an American
tradition.
51. There is no legitimate business reason for prohibiting
peanuts inside of the United Center.
Count I
Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
52. The United Center possesses monopoly power over food
concession sales at the United Center.
53. Precise numbers are not known to Plaintiffs, but upon
information and belief Defendant controls over 90% of all food
concession sales inside and outside the stadium.
54. Defendant has used its monopoly power over access to the
United Center for anticompetitive, exclusionary, and predatory
purposes to maintain and foster their monopoly on food concessions
at the United Center in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. sec 2.).
55. Defendant's refusal to allow peanuts in the United
Center, coupled with the absence of a legitimate business purpose
for doing so, amounts to a refusal to deal with Plaintiffs as
competitors in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.
sec. 2.)
56. Defendant's actions which constitute a violation of the
Antitrust provisions have proximately caused damage and economic
loss to Plaintiffs.
Count II
Interference with Business and Prospective Advantage
57. This Count II is a common law tort claim brought pursuant
to the Court's pendant jurisdiction for state claims.
58. Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectancy of entering a
valid business relationship with United Center patrons, that is the
sale of peanuts to such patrons.
59. Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiffs' reasonable
expectancy of entering a valid business relationship with United
Center patrons.
60. Defendant's actions in interfering with the reasonable
expectancy were intentional and malicious.
61. The failure of United Center patrons to enter into the
valid business relationship with Plaintiffs, and to purchase their
peanuts, was due to the actions of Defendant.
62. As a direct proximate result Defendant's actions in
interfering with the reasonable expectancy Plaintiffs suffered
damage including loss of sales and lost profits.
63. Punitive damages are appropriate to punish Defendant for
its wilful and malicious actions, and to deter others from such
actions.
Injunctive Relief Sought
64. Plaintiffs seek immediate and permanent relief on their
claims in Count I and Count II of the Complaint because Plaintiffs
will be irreparably damaged if the ban on peanuts in the United
Center continues as presently dictated by the Defendant.
65. Plaintiffs are suffering and will continue to suffer
injury as a result of Defendant's alleged misconduct.
66. Plaintiffs do not have an adequate remedy at law to
prevent Defendant from violating their interests in the sale of
peanuts to United Center patrons, and money damages alone cannot
compensate Plaintiffs for the violation of their rights.
67. Plaintiffs have a clear and ascertainable right to
protection of their legitimate and reasonable rights, including the
value of the sales of their peanuts to patrons of the United
Center.
68. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their
claims in Count I and Count II.
69. Defendant should be prohibited and enjoined from resuming
the ban on peanuts and other food items in the United Center in any
manner other than that which previously existed.
70. Plaintiffs request that this Court enter an order that
the Defendant resume the previous policy of allowing patrons to
bring peanuts into Chicago Blackhawks games, Chicago Bulls games,
and other events at the United Center.
71. By Defendant's actions Plaintiffs have been denied the
opportunity to sell their peanuts to patrons of the United Center,
and Plaintiffs request that this Court enjoin Defendant from
enforcing the ban on peanuts brought in the United Center.
72. Defendant should be prohibited and enjoined from
enforcing its ban on peanuts brought in the United Center.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demands judgment in their favor and
against Defendant, and pray for the following relief:
A. That the monopolization, and the predatory,
anticompetitive and exclusionary acts committed in furtherance
thereof, be adjudged a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. sec. 2.);
B. That Plaintiffs be awarded damages for their lost profits
from the sale of peanuts outside the United Center, including
compensatory damages in excess of $1,000,000, or such other
compensatory damages which shall be proven at trial;
C. That Plaintiffs be awarded treble damages determined to
have been sustained by each of them due to the monopolistic conduct
of the Defendant, and that judgment be entered against Defendant;
D. That Defendant be enjoined from any further predatory,
anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct by which their unlawful
monopoly on food concessions has been maintained;
E. That Defendant be enjoined from banning peanuts in the
United Center;
F. That Plaintiffs recover from Defendant the costs of this
suit and reasonable attorneys fees in accordance with Section 4 of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. sec. 15);
G. Punitive damages in excess of $2,000,000;
H. Plaintiffs demand trial by jury of all matters so triable
pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
and
I. That Plaintiffs have such other and further relief as the
Court may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
___________________________
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Donald G. Weiland
Attorney for Plaintiffs
135 S. LaSalle, Ste. 2140
Chicago, IL 60603
(312)782-1403
Mark Weinberg
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3612 N. Tripp
Chicago, IL 60614
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